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Abstract 
The consequences of legal access to medical marijuana for individual welfare are a matter of 
controversy. We contribute to the ongoing discussion by evaluating the impact of the staggered 
introduction and extension of medical marijuana laws across US states on self-reported mental 
health. Our main analysis is based on BRFSS survey data from more than six million respondents 
between 1993 and 2015. On average, we find that medical marijuana laws lead to a reduction in 
the self-reported number of days with mental health problems. Reductions are largest for 
individuals with high propensities to consume marijuana for medical purposes and people who are 
likely to suffer from chronic pain. Moreover, the introduction of prescription drug monitoring 
programs lead to a reduction in bad mental health days only in states that allow medical marijuana. 
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1 Introduction
The legal status of cannabis has become successively more liberal in many countries in
recent years. In the United States, 31 states had eased access to cannabis via decrimi-
nalization, medical programs or recreational allowances by 2018. Yet, debates regarding
specific regulations are usually contentious. Major controversies revolve around the long-term
consequences of cannabis consumption. To date, these consequences are not well understood,
partly because strict regulations also encumber medical research. Besides disagreement
regarding the therapeutic value of marijuana, there is also no consensus about the potential
externalities, such as procurement crimes, as well as the potential negative internalities
due to addiction. The medical marijuana movement is thus concurrently understood as an
attempt to bring back marijuana for therapeutic purposes to help people with chronic cancer
pain, spasticity, nausea, or loss of appetite, and as a Trojan horse for the legalization of
recreational abuse (Kilmer and MacCoun 2017). We contribute to this discussion with a
comprehensive evaluation of the effect of US medical marijuana laws (MML) on self-reported
mental health. These laws generally protect consumers of marijuana (including strains with
high THC) for medical purposes from criminal penalties, and sometimes allow access to
marijuana through dispensaries or home cultivation.
In contrast to studies focusing on mere changes in consumption patterns, our metric tries to
capture welfare differences due to regulatory differences in an encompassing way. This is
important because there are various channels by which MMLs can affect individual welfare.
First, there could be direct effects on existing cannabis consumers, as well as on those people
who start to consume it under loosened regulations. Some studies find that MMLs have
beneficial effects such as decreasing state opioid fatality rates when cannabis is used as an
analgesic (Bachhuber et al. 2014, Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson 2015, and Wen, Hockenberry,
and Cummings 2015), or even decreasing the prevalence of suicide (Anderson, Rees, and
Sabia 2014). However, there are also studies that report on detrimental effects of relaxed
cannabis regulation, such as an increase in marijuana abuse (Cerdá et al. 2012, Pacula
et al. 2015), especially in adolescents due to low levels of self-control (Resko 2014). Second,
a relaxation of cannabis regulation is associated with potential negative externalities, such
as procurement crimes (Morris et al. 2014, Kepple and Freisthler 2012) and decreased traffic
security (Anderson, Hansen, and Rees 2013). Third, a relaxation of cannabis regulation
can increase the potential for additional tax revenues and also reduce the illicit supply of
non-medical drugs in general (Gavrilova, Kamada, and Zoutman 2018). Many more aspects
could be added (and will be in Section 2). Consequently, an evaluation of the net welfare
effects of medicinal marijuana laws is challenging, because potentially beneficial as well as
detrimental externalities and internalities need to be weighted against each other.1
In this paper, we attempt to provide a policy evaluation that captures the net welfare effects
1. Not surprisingly, there is no consensus about an “optimal” regulatory regime. This holds, for example,
for the most important control factors (Caulkins et al. 2012) and even for the goals of the law (Room 2014,
Richter and Levy 2014).
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of medical marijuana policies. For this, we use self-reported mental health as a proxy measure
for individual welfare. A similar approach has been applied, for example, by Gruber and
Mullainathan (2005) and Odermatt and Stutzer (2015) to evaluate tobacco control policies
based on reported subjective well-being. To identify the policy effects on people’s mental
well-being, we exploit the staggered introduction of all MMLs in the United States until the
end of 2015. The basis for our analysis is repeated cross-sectional data from the Behavioral
Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) from 1993 until the end of 2015, covering all
US states and the District of Columbia. The data comprise a total of around 6.3 million
observations. Additionally, we make use of the National Survey on Drug Use and Health
(NSDUH), which provides information on individual cannabis consumption behavior. In
the two-way panel estimations, we consider state-level institutional information on beer
taxes, cigarette taxes, Medicaid expenditures, and minimum wages to control for possibly
confounding institutional variation across states and over time. In a supplementary analysis,
we study the interaction of MMLs with Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs),
which are state-level institutions that require physicians to check their patients’ medical
histories when prescribing them potentially addictive drugs.
Overall, we find no evidence that MMLs have a detrimental effect on mental health. On
the contrary, we observe overall reductions in the number of bad mental health days and
that these are concentrated mainly in the first three years following the introduction of
the laws. Studying the heterogeneity in MMLs, we find that the improvements primarily
arise in states that have the most liberal medical marijuana regimes (specifically, those that
allow the prescription of cannabis for unspecific pain), as is the case in California. For less
liberal regulations (adopted mainly in later periods), we do not find any systematic effects,
on average. In the analysis of the impact of MMLs on different subgroups, we do not find
any evidence that presumed risk groups, such as young adults, are negatively affected by
liberal regimes. We find the most pronounced beneficial effects in terms of reduced mental
health problems for likely pain sufferers and medical marijuana consumers. The effect size
for the latter group amounts to approximately 0.6 fewer days with self-reported bad mental
health per month, where the group mean amounts to approximately 6.6 days. In addition,
we find spatial spillover effects, i.e., a reduction in mental health problems owing to the
introduction of MMLs in neighboring states, as well as smaller treatment effects if neighboring
states already have a MML in place. Lastly, our analysis of the effects of Prescription Drug
Monitoring Programs suggests that mental health is only positively affected by PDMPs if
they are introduced in a state that has an effective MML. This suggests that MMLs might
be seen as complements to PDMPs. Overall, our findings are in line with more optimistic
views that see medicinal marijuana laws as legitimate implementations of targeted policies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we summarize potential
consequences of MMLs and discuss the previous literature in more detail. In Section 3,
we describe the institutional data on the regulation of medical marijuana as well as the
individual data on mental health, cannabis consumption and pain. In the same section, we
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also present and qualify our empirical strategy. Sections 4, 5, and 6 describe our results.
Section 7 offers concluding remarks.
2 Potential consequences of medical marijuana laws
We summarize potential channels by which the introduction of a MML might affect people’s
mental health in Figure 1. The graph depicts effects that are mediated by the impact on
consumption behavior.2 We distinguish between the consequences of MMLs on the controlled
consumption of cannabis for medical or recreational purposes, and uncontrolled consumption,
i.e., the overconsumption or abuse of cannabis. It is this trade-off between the potential
beneficial value of marijuana as a new therapeutic option and the detrimental risk of over-
consumption or abuse which stands in the focus of our reasoning. We restrict the possible
side-effect on non-consumers to externalities and do not consider option values or other
direct effects on those who abstain from marijuana both before and after the intervention.
In our subsequent short review of the literature, we summarize the recent findings along the
mentioned channels in Figure 1.
Figure (1) - Representation of potential channels by which MMLs might influence mental
health.
Medical marijuana law Consumption choice Mental health
Externalities
indirect
Overconsumption/abuse
Controlled intake
+
− ?
There are several studies that report the therapeutic value of marijuana under controlled con-
sumption. Meta-analyses show analgesic and other medicinal benefits of cannabis compared
to placebo treatments (Martin-Sanchez et al. 2009, Whiting et al. 2015, Iskedjian et al. 2007).
In contrast, the risks associated with marijuana consumption are less clear. Examples of
potential harmful effects are neurological decline (Meier et al. 2012), cardiovascular diseases
(Hall and Degenhardt 2009) and schizophrenia (Semple, McIntosh, and Lawrie 2005). How-
2. A short discussion of the environmental and individual-level determinants of consumption can be found
in Appendix B.1.
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ever, the verdict on whether facilitated access to medical marijuana is deemed predominantly
beneficial or detrimental will depend, ceteris paribus, on its comparative advantages over
alternative treatments that employ, for example, the opioid-based drugs codeine or oxycontin.
In view of the well-documented side-effects caused by opioids and studies such as Bachhuber
et al. (2014), which report fewer opioid-related fatalities in MML states, controlled cannabis
intake for medical purposes can be seen as an efficacious alternative to established analgesics.
MMLs facilitate access to cannabis not only for medical use, but also for recreational con-
sumption (Jacobi and Sovinsky 2016). Any welfare effects of potential diversion are hard to
judge. They depend on the consumption value of cannabis to consumers, the concomitant
risk of non-rational dependency and the degree to which the diverted marijuana is consumed
as a complement or a substitute to other substances. Cerdá et al. (2012) show that cannabis
consumption increases due to MMLs but not due to an increased probability of substance
addiction. With regard to adolescents – who are often claimed to be a major risk group –
no systematic change in marijuana use is found in response to the introduction of MMLs
(e.g., Hasin et al. 2015 and Wall et al. 2016). However, MML exposure tends to reduce the
highschool graduation rate (Plunk et al. 2016), expected labour earnings for young males
(Sabia and Nguyen 2016) and academic performance (Marie and Zölitz 2017), particularly in
the case of comparatively weak students. In contrast, Sabia, Swigert, and Young (2017) find
that states which have MMLs exhibit a lower prevalence of obesity among the young as well as
increased physical mobility among the elderly. In addition to introducing MMLs, some states
abolished jail sentences for punishing the cannabis offences of first-time consumption and
small-scale possession. While this legislative amendment appears to be a liberal policy that
might promote cannabis consumption more than MMLs do, the evidence regarding its effect
on consumption decisions is mixed (Pacula, Chriqui, and King 2003, Miech et al. 2015, Single
1989). Lastly, there might be complex long-term impacts of the legalization on cannabis
for recreational use. Examples of such effects include the dynamic evolution of marijuana-
related subcultures, as well as adaptive processes (e.g., adoption of consumption habits
over time) with potential impacts on the population’s mental health (Hall and Lynskey 2016).
With regard to externalities, the literature reports a multitude of effects. Examples of
these effects are decreased absenteeism from work (Ullman 2017), accidental ingestion of
cannabis by young children (Wang, Roosevelt, and Heard 2013) or a negative environmental
impact of local cultivation (Carah et al. 2015). Furthermore, there are several studies
that report systematic relationships between MMLs and the rate of traffic fatalities. For
example, Anderson, Hansen, and Rees (2013) and Reiman (2009) find substantial decreases
in traffic fatalities due to the substitutional relationship between marijuana and alcohol,
while Pacula et al. (2015) and Yörük and Yörük (2011) conclude the opposite due to an
estimated complementary relationship. Smart (2015) reports asymmetric impacts conditional
on age: While the young cause more drug-related traffic accidents, the reverse holds for older
adults who drink less alcohol due to the availability of medical cannabis. This suggests that
omitted treatment response heterogeneity could be one of the causes of the mixed findings in
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the literature. Overall, it is hard to derive a sensible prior for the net effect of externalities
on mental health.
Given the various ways in which easier access to cannabis might affect individual welfare,
the net welfare effects are difficult to identify. Since marijuana prohibition is an impedi-
ment to some research enquiries (Gordon, Conley, and Gordon 2013), it is not even easy
to ascertain the welfare effects of marijuana consumption itself empirically. Furthermore,
observable consumption behavior is insufficient to evaluate policies that facilitate access
to marijuana. Observed intake does not capture, for example, the motivation underlying
cannabis consumption, the potential causation of externalities, or network effects such as
the impact on the consumption value of cannabis for peers. In the light of this reasoning,
we aim to analyze the net effect of medical marijuana laws using mental health as a proxy
measure for individual welfare.
3 Data description and empirical strategy
3.1 Medical marijuana regulations in the United States
The regulation of medical marijuana differs widely across US states and ranges from laws that
provide only minimal access to laws that permit an almost unrestricted supply of cannabis for
medical as well as recreational use. While marijuana was effectively illegal before 1996 in all
states, California pioneered the United States’ first MML in November 1996.3 By December
31, 2015, 23 states had followed suit in liberalizing access to medical marijuana. Figure
2 presents a map of the United States showing the legislation on cannabis for each state,
including Washington D.C., at the end of 2015: It shows whether an MML was in place, as
well as whether recreational use and possession were legal. Furthermore, the figure indicates
whether or not a state was entitled to impose a jail sentence for first-time consumption or
small-scale possession of cannabis.4
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the changes in the regulation of marijuana over time. In
total, there are 24 different dates on which MMLs were introduced, which we can exploit in
our empirical analysis. Furthermore, eight states abolished the punishment of imposing a jail
sentence on a first-time offender for cannabis consumption and small-scale possession during
our sampling period. Regarding recreational use, however, we only observe five changes in
legislation from 2012 onwards. While we include these two latter regime changes as control
variables in our analysis, the estimates of their effect should be interpreted with caution due
to the limited variation across time. As our treatment indicator, we consider the date when
3. We thereby ignore minor concessions, such as the Alaska law case Ravin v. State in 1975 which declared
that small possessions of marijuana at home would be protected by privacy laws.
4. One visible pattern is the geographical clustering of laws. States in the west and northeast of America
seem much more likely to adopt medical marijuana laws than the states in other regions of the country. In
particular, the conservative so-called “Bible Belt” region in the south-east appears to be reluctant to liberalize
or decriminalize marijuana in any form.
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Figure (2) - Regulation of (medical) marijuana across the US states at the end of 2015.
No MML Effective MML No jail Recreational
Washington
D.C.
Alaska Hawaii
Notes: No jail indicated by a blue border shows whether first-time consumption and small-scale possession of cannabis in violation of the law are punishable by a jail
sentence or not. Recreational shows whether recreational use and possession is legal in the respective state. For a comprehensive table of legislation introduction
dates, see Appendix F. Data source: Own compilation.
a MML became effective (rather than when it was passed). An overview of the respective
dates can be found in Appendix G. In addition, we capture and classify law heterogeneity,
such as different qualifying medical conditions that give patients legal access to medical
marijuana. However, this is not a trivial task. Several taxonomies designed to capture
relevant distinctions in the law and their timing have been proposed (Pacula, Boustead, and
Hunt 2014, Chapman et al. 2016, Williams et al. 2016). We follow the practice of recent
analyses and consider the legislation that protects individuals who possess cannabis for
medical purposes from prosecution, the authorization of home cultivation, the presence of
operational dispensaries, as well as unspecific pain as a qualifying condition. The rationale
behind these choices will be explained in Section 4.3, when estimates for the effects of the
different policy dimensions are discussed.
3.2 Individual-level data: Mental health
Our main data source is the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). It con-
sists of repeated cross-sections of telephone surveys which target US residents above the
age of 18. In every year, the respondents answer the following question regarding their
mental state of health: “Now thinking about your mental health, which includes stress,
depression, and problems with emotions, for how many days during the past 30 days was
your mental health not good?”. In our analysis, we focus on the answers to this ques-
tion as our primary outcome variable. The number of bad mental health days can be
understood as a proxy measure for subjective well-being. The relevance of this measure
is shown by various studies which report that self-reported mental health is, for example,
a good predictor of help-seeking behavior (Hunt and Eisenberg 2010), suicide (Bramness
et al. 2010) or psychological functioning and mortality (Lee 2000). This metric is available for
almost all individuals in all states and years with an item non-response of approximately 2%.5
Looking at the sample distribution of bad mental health days in Figure 3, the strong spike
at zero indicates that almost 70 percent of the respondents did not experience bad mental
health on any of the days during the previous month at the time of their interview. In the
bottom plot of the figure, we see that, conditional on having at least one bad mental health
day, a majority of people report experiencing between one and five days with bad mental
health during the previous month. Furthermore, in higher ranges of the distribution, we
observe bunching at five-point intervals. Figure 5 shows the evolution of these extensive
and intensive components of average reported bad mental health days over the last 23 years.
Diverging trends for these components are apparent in general. While the population reports
more days with mental health problems over time, on average this increase does not seem to
be driven by an increase in the share of aﬄicted individuals. Instead, conditional on having
problems, the number of people’s reported bad mental health days grew progressively over
5. For a more general discussion of self-reported health and well-being measures in policy evaluations, see,
e.g., Dolan, Layard, and Metcalfe (2011) and Odermatt and Stutzer (2018). A possible objection to our main
outcome variable is the risk of simultaneity. People with mental health problems might want to self-medicate
using cannabis, and therefore advocate MMLs or sort into states which have such a regime in place. However,
medical research does not support this critique (Harris and Edlund 2005, Van Ours et al. 2013).
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Figure (3) - Distribution of the number of bad mental health days during the last 30 days.
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Bottom plot: Conditional on at least one bad mental health day
Data source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
Figure (4) - Timeline of cannabis regime adoptions in US states.
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Data source: Own compilation.
the last two decades. This suggests that distributional effects should also be considered in a
policy evaluation. We analyze such effects in Section 4.1.6
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Figure (5) - Time series of the extensive and intensive margin of self-reported bad mental
health days in the United States.
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Data source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
For our analysis, it would be valuable to know about individual cannabis consumption
behavior. However, in the BRFSS this question is only available from 2014 onwards. In order
to study the policies’ potentially heterogeneous effects conditional on individual propensities
to consume (medical) marijuana, we make use of a second major data source, namely the
National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH). The NSDUH offers national data on the
use and abuse of addictive drugs in the US population aged 12 and older. It is frequently used
as the basis for estimating the national prevalence of and state trends regarding, for example,
opioid dependence. We are primarily interested in two questions contained in the survey.
First, in every wave respondents are asked to answer the question, "During the past 30 days,
on how many days did you use marijuana or hashish?". Based on the answers to this question,
Figure 6 shows that the general trend in marijuana consumption has increased since 1994.
The picture is consistent with the successive liberalization and decriminalization of marijuana
that we observe over time. However, the descriptive patterns cannot tell us to what extent
the trends are driven by changes in the legal status of medical marijuana. Second, from 2013
onwards, the NSDUH also asks the survey participants whether some or all of their cannabis
consumption is recommended by a doctor. Additionally, the information whether the respon-
6. In 2011, the BRFFS landline interviews were complemented with mobile phone sampling. Additionally,
a more sophisticated weighting method was introduced in compliance with the new sampling scheme,
providing representativeness regarding additional socio-demographic variables (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention 2012).
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Figure (6) - United States national cannabis consumption rates over time by age group.
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Note: An observation is classified as a consumer if the respondent used cannabis on at least
five days within the last 30 days. Data source: NSDUH. Calculated using survey weights.
dent lives in a state with some form of legal medical cannabis program is provided.7 These
variables allow us to augment the BRFSS data with consumption propensity scores based on a
predictive model for consumer status. Details of the procedure will be discussed in Section 5.1.
3.3 Empirical strategy
Most of the econometric analyses are based on the following estimation specification:
yist = βmmlst treatment dummy
+ γZst + ωXist state & individual controls
+ αs + θt + tλs time & state fixed effects and trends
+ ist error (clustered at the state level)
The dependent variable yist is the self-reported number of bad mental health days in the
last 30 days of individual i living in state s in year t.8 Our primary explanatory variable of
interest is mmlst, a binary treatment dummy indicating whether in state s at time t a MML
7. Due to the new regulations of the institution SAMHDA, which publishes the NSDUH, access to state
identifiers cannot be provided to researchers who are not resident in the US.
8. The scaling of our outcome variable has some technical implications. As it is a censored count variable,
non-linear estimators such as Tobit or Poisson regressions might be considered. We refrain from applying
them as there is no consensus regarding the handling of clustered errors in maximum-likelihood frameworks.
Furthermore, the possibility of negative predictions for some sets of covariates does not affect the validity of
our conclusions, since we are interested in net overall effects only.
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is in place or not. The estimated parameter β, thereby, represents the average treatment
effect (ATE) of the policy to the extent that our control strategy captures all observable and
unobservable differences between treatment and control states. We use the exact interview
and MML introduction dates to determine the treatment status for every observation on a
daily basis. Furthermore, we capture potential lead effects of the policy introductions with
dummies indicating observations one and two years before the respective policy introductions.
In general, we would expect the lead coefficients to be either zero or of the same sign as the
treatment effect if anticipatory effects occur (for example, due to changes in law enforcement).
In the light of the geographic clustering in Figure 2 and the results of Bradford and David
Bradford (2017) who conclude that border diffusion and voter ideology are important drivers
of MML adoption, a careful strategy to control for potential confounding factors is required.
We address such issues by including various control variables. Xist is a vector of variables at
the individual level, controlling for differential socio-demographic compositions across states
which might be correlated with the adoption of the policy. Specifically, we control for age,
education, marital status, employment, income, the acquisition of a health plan, sex, race, and
the number of children who live in the household (in categories capped at three). However,
state-level controls are arguably more important when striving for causal interpretations of
the effect of the state-level policies. We therefore consider the vector Zst of state variables
including the unemployment rate, the beer tax, the cigarette tax, an indicator for urbanity
on the county-level, the minimum wage, indicators for the parties holding political control in
a state, as well as expenditures per capita for the Medicaid and the Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) programs. All monetary values are in real terms. We also take
into account whether a state abolished jail sentences for first-time offenders for cannabis
consumption and whether it legalized cannabis for recreational consumption. Additionally,
we include interactions of MMLs with neighboring states’ laws in the form of a dummy
which equals one if at least in one adjacent state an effective MML is in place. A separate
dummy captures whether a neighboring state allows cannabis for recreational consumption.
Recently, the results of Hao and Cowan (2017) and Hansen, Miller, and Weber (2017) point
towards the importance of such spatial controls. Descriptive statistics and sources for the
respective variables can be found in Appendix F. Finally, we include state as well as time
fixed effects and state-specific linear trends in order to control for some forms of unobserved
heterogeneity across states.
4 Main results
4.1 Overall effects
Our specifications in Table 1 show the overall effect of an MML on bad mental health
days based on different samples for the control states. The main variable of interest is the
dummy variable “Overall MML” which captures the net effect for all years after the adoption
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of the law. Two further dummy variables capture the potential lead effects of the policy
introductions.
Table (1) - Overall effect of medical marijuana laws (MML) on the number of days per
month with bad mental health.
All states Any law Effective law
No. of days No. of days No. of days No. of days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Two years before MML −0.106 −0.108 −0.111 −0.087
(0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.074)
One year before MML −0.081 −0.087 −0.088 −0.073
(0.113) (0.110) (0.109) (0.093)
Overall MML −0.182∗ −0.227∗∗ −0.230∗∗ −0.211∗∗
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.083)
Border × MML − 0.082 0.087 0.138∗∗
(0.061) (0.062) (0.061)
Border MML − −0.074 −0.076 −0.172∗∗
(0.068) (0.072) (0.075)
Sample means 3.361 3.361 3.364 3.359
Time FE
State FE
State trends
Controls
Clusters 51 51 45 29
Observations 6,349,173 6,349,173 5,540,433 3,631,697
Adjusted R2 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.084
∗ p < 0.1 ; ∗∗ p < 0.05 ; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: In column (3), only states are included which introduce or have in place some form of
liberalized cannabis regulation during the considered time period. The sample in column (4)
is further restricted to states which at some point introduced an effective medical marijuana
measure as categorized in the Marijuana Policy Project (2016). Clustered standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Due to few clusters, p-values in (3) and (4) refer to T(#Cluster
-1) distributions (see Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008). The row sample means reports
the average bad mental health days (dependent variable) of the respective sample. Data
source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
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The results in column (1) show a reduction of approximately 0.18 in the number of bad
mental health days per month when a state introduces an MML. Hence, adults in MML states
experience, on average approximately two fewer bad mental health days per year due to the
law. However, the effect is only significantly different from zero by a small margin. In column
(2), we allow MMLs to both spill over into neighboring states (row “Border MML”) and to
interact with the MMLs that these neighboring states might have in place (row “Border ×
MML”). By implementing this spatial control, the overall MML effect now indicates the effect
of an MML if no neighboring state already operates an MML. In such a case, the effect size is
slightly bigger and more precisely estimated. If a neighboring state has already implemented
an MML, the introduction of a medical marijuana law still exhibits a positive effect on mental
health on top of the pure neighborhood effect, yet the sum of the main law effect and the
interaction with a bordering MML, amounting to -0.145, is not significant at the usual levels.9
In columns (3) and (4), we consider the possibility that the states which do not change any
of their cannabis regulations in our sample might form an inappropriate control group. For
example, tight cannabis regulations could be related to unobserved characteristics of states,
such as a puritan culture, which are systematically related to the impact of an MML. In
order to make the states more comparable, we first restrict the sample to states which have
adopted some form of regulation in column (3). Compared to column (2), no qualitative
differences become visible. In column (4), we restrict the sample further by only considering
those states that adopted an effective MML up until 2017, as classified in the report of
the Marijuana Policy Project (2016). The changes in the main effect owing to the altered
sample definition are, again, rather small. However, the spill-over effects of bordering MMLs
are stronger. We find a significant positive spill-over effect of MMLs on mental health in
neighboring states which have not yet introduced a MML themselves. Furthermore, MML
introduction is observed to have a reduced effect in an environment where at least one
neighboring state has an MML in place.
Figure 7 illustrates the dynamic effects of MMLs in a flexible way, allowing for differential
effects four years before, and up to five years after the introduction. We observe anticipatory
effects before the actual implementation. This would be consistent with a de facto liberaliza-
tion in the respective states before the de jure implementation. Improvements in terms of
fewer bad mental health days seem to accrue primarily in the early years after adoption and
start to vanish four years after introduction. An interpretation is difficult, not least because
a limited set of states contributes to the estimation of the dynamic effects (as in some states
laws are not in place for long enough). In this context, Williams et al. (2016) highlight that
early adopter states have vastly higher enrollment rates for their programs than late adopter
states. This renders the assumption of homogeneous treatments questionable, which we
9. We have tested the robustness of the results in column (2) based on two placebo tests: First, we
re-estimated the specification five hundred times using randomly chosen introduction dates for the MMLs in
the treated states. Lead effects and neighbourhood dummies have been adjusted to these new pseudo dates
for every run. In the second test, we additionally assigned placebo laws with random dates to all states
rather than only the treated ones. The results are robust to both of these exercises; i.e., our treatment effect
estimate lies beneath the 5% quantile of the distribution of pseudo-effects.
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Figure (7) - Dynamic overall effects of medical marijuana laws (MML).
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Notes: States which do not contribute observations throughout the considered time frame
are excluded to avoid spurious effects due to changes in the sample. Confidence intervals are
set at 90%. Data source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
implicitly endorsed in our main specification (1). We consider this objection in Section 4.3,
where we consider the heterogeneity in the law.
Figure 8 shows the distributional changes induced by MMLs regarding different initial levels
of mental health. Technically, the plot reports the results of a conditional density estimation
where certain ranges of bad mental health days are collected into bins. For each of the seven
intervals shown on the x-axis of the figure, we first code a dummy which equals one if an
individual’s reported number of bad mental health days falls within it. We then use this
dummy as the dependent variable in a linear probability model. The figure suggests that
the improvements reported so far are driven by a reduction in the number of people (net
outflow) in the categories that report only a few days or an extremely large number of days
with mental health problems. Of course, this is not sufficient to conclude that nobody loses
in an MML regime. Still, the plot indicates that this statistical analysis has not identified
any group that is systematically harmed by such laws.
Overall, the evidence so far indicates that MMLs are not only a non-harmful form of legislative
intervention, but that they are distinctly beneficial, at least in the short- and medium-run.
In the following, we analyze how regulations impacted states differently. We then shed light
on the role of different key policy dimensions in determining the effect that MMLs have on
mental health in the general population.
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Figure (8) - Overall distributional effect of medical marijuana laws.
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weights.
4.2 State heterogeneity
MMLs vary substantially across states and over time. For example, the most liberal law
was introduced in California. The state’s initial regulation did not impose clear marijuana
possession limits, and in 2010, the California Supreme Court officially lifted such restrictions
altogether (Cartier 2010). An example of a state that enforced a conservative regulation is
New Jersey, where five years after the passage of the law, three operational dispensaries were
the only legal sources for medical cannabis. Besides differences in the scope of the law and
in juristic details, heterogeneity in treatment responses might also arise due to differences
in effective law enforcement. Hawaii is an example. While a nominally restrictive medical
marijuana law was passed in 2000, its lax enforcement made the net effect of its passage
ambiguous from a theoretical point of view (Nixon 2013).
In a first attempt to gauge the effect of legal heterogeneity, Figure 9 reports estimates for the
overall effect of an MML for every state separately, ordered in accordance with the size and
direction of the effect. As previously, we employ the same control strategy except that we
replace the overall MML dummy with a separate one for every treated state. Here, the effect
of the introduction is strongest for California, being both highly systematic and sizeable in
reducing the total number of bad mental health days by 0.45 per month. Given the liberal
nature of California’s implementation, the magnitude is plausibly driven not only by patients,
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but also by changes in recreational use. Massachusetts, on the other hand, exhibits the most
pronounced detrimental effect, i.e., a precisely measured positive effect on bad mental health
days of around the same magnitude as California’s improvements in mental health. The
90% confidence interval for the average of all the coefficients is approximately [−0.14, −0.04].
Hence, giving all the states that introduced a MML equal weight (but allowing for differential
estimates of the standard errors) results in a smaller yet more precisely measured overall
improvement in mental health. This result reports the average effect of the average law
rather than the treatment effect predicted to be experienced by a random person from the
sample.
In order to understand the ranking across states, we include further characteristics of the
states and their MMLs in Figure 9. First, we consider single variables which might drive the
observed differences. For example, the length of time that a law was in place up until the
end of our observation period in 2015 could influence estimates. We check this and indicate
the number of years that a law was active by the coloring of the point estimates in the chart.
It is revealed that the early adopters appear to be over-represented on the left, where six
out of eight states exhibit negative net effects on bad mental health days. With regard
to the number of years that an MML was implemented, no pattern emerges for years 1–5
and 6–12. Second, we consider whether states are predominantly led by Democrats or by
Republicans, indicated by a diamond- or cross-shaped point estimate. Partisanship might well
be associated with unobservables, such as more or less liberal attitudes or the restrictiveness
in the implemented cannabis regulations. Figure 9, however, reveals no systematic pattern
along this dimension. In an additional analysis (not shown), we also compared laws which
were passed by popular ballot with those approved by state legislatures. Again, no clear
pattern appears.
In an additional analysis, we investigate the extent to which the overall effect changes if one
individual state that introduces an MML is left out. The results of this exercise are reported
in Figure 10. As the plot shows, the effect of MMLs is considerably smaller and statistically
not different from zero when California is excluded. This is in line with the large effect size
in Figure 9 and the importance California has in our estimates due to its population size.
The use of survey weights which respect differential state population sizes can also explain
why the exclusion of Hawaii barely changes the estimate, although it exhibits a considerable
effect size. In 2012, this state only accounted for approximately 0.4% of the United State’s
inhabitants.10 The exclusion of all other states besides California does not alter the estimated
effect size, however. Given the importance of observations from California, we also report
the results for effect heterogeneity across consumer groups in Section 5 when California is
excluded.
10. Alternative weighting schemes could be applied. For instance, one might require weights inside a
state-year cell to sum to one. Alternatively, we could simply dispense with sample weights. We report a
re-estimation of Table 1 using these possibilities in Appendix A.1.
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Figure (9) - Overall effect of medical marijuana laws by state.
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Notes: The symbol shapes and colors represent political control and the time the respective
law has been in place, respectively. Categories for the number of years a law has been active
have been set using the sample terciles. Party control is determined by the state time average
of the partisanship score introduced in Caughey, Warshaw, and Xu (2015). Confidence
intervals are set at 90%. Data source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
Figure (10) - Sensitivity of overall effects regarding the omission of the specified individual
states one at a time.
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Notes: Estimations are based on the main specification (1). The states listed on the x-axis
were individually omitted in each of the successive estimations. Confidence intervals are set
at 90%. Data source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
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4.3 Law heterogeneity
In order to analyze the extent to which institutional variation might drive the differential
effects previously discussed in Figure 9, we define further dummy variables characterizing
important policy dimensions of the MMLs.
MML dimensions
• Law only: Possession of marijuana for the treatment of certain medical condition is
legal. Sometimes, access is conditional on the patient being registered with an official
office. Under this MML regime, access is eased in so far as doctors can prescribe
cannabis for a specific set of ailments, excluding chronic pain.
• Home cultivation: In addition to the juristic protection offered by a “law only”
regime, citizens who receive medical cards from a state office either as patients or
caregivers can cultivate some amount of marijuana at home.
• Unspecific pain: “Pain due to an unspecified cause” is one of the conditions that
allows a physician to legally issue prescriptions. This means that the experienced pain
does not need to be diagnosed as resulting from an acknowledged illness.
• Dispensaries: At least one operational state-approved dispensary exists for issuing.
Table 2 provides an overview of the heterogeneity in MMLs across states with regard to the
different policy dimensions. This variation in the implemented laws is exploited for the esti-
mation of the differential effects of the various policy dimensions. Table 3 reports the results
for the inclusion of separate dummies one by one for the different dimensions in columns
(2)–(4). The estimates corresponding to these dummies need to be interpreted as interactions
with the presence of a basic MML which only provides legal defense for medical possession.
In columns (5)–(7), two dimensions are included at a time, respectively, and they are allowed
to interact with each other. Both columns (8) and (9) include all four policy dimensions
(with “law only” being the reference category captured in “overall MML” in column (8)) and
their interactions. The difference between the columns is that (8) introduces them all as
interaction dummies (like in the columns before) whose coefficients report deviations from
the effect of a basic MML, whereas column (9) presents a satiated formulation. This means
that a separate dummy for every possible combination of policy dimension is introduced, of
which there are eight. This facilitates the interpretation, as the coefficients directly indicate
the net effect of these policies. Hence, for example, the coefficient “home & pain” in column
(9) suggests that an MML which allows for both home cultivation and unspecific pain results
in an average reduction of 0.294 bad mental health days per month. This estimate incorpo-
rates a possible interaction between the home cultivation and the unspecific pain dimension.11
11. Note that there is not enough variation to credibly estimate the effect of the “pain only” and “pain &
dispensary” law configurations. The coefficients reflect more or less state rather than dimension specific law
effects which might well be driven by other aspects than just juristic differences.
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Table (2) - Summary of major policy dimensions characterizing states’ medical marijuana
laws.
State Law Home Pain Disp. Home & Home & Pain & Home, pain
only only only only pain disp. disp. & disp.
Maryland 7 - - - - - - -
New Hampshire 7 - - - - - - -
New York 7 - - - - - - -
Connecticut 7 - - 7 - - - -
District of Columbia 7 - - 7 - - - -
Illinois 7 - - 7 - - - -
Montana 7 - - 7 - - - -
New Jersey 7 - - 7 - - - -
Massachusetts - 7 - - - 7 - -
Maine - 7 - - - 7 - -
New Mexico - 7 - - - 7 - -
Vermont - 7 - - - 7 - -
Delaware - - 7 - - - 7 -
Washington - - 7 - 7 - - -
Arkansaw - - - - 7 - - -
Hawaii - - - - 7 - - -
Montana - - - - 7 - - -
Arizona - - - - 7 - - 7
California - - - - 7 - - 7
Colorado - - - - 7 - - 7
Michigan - - - - 7 - - 7
Nevada - - - - 7 - - 7
Oregon - - - - 7 - - 7
Rhode Island - - - - 7 - - 7
Notes: This table represents the spatial variation in legal heterogeneity exploited for the
estimation of the differential effects of policy dimensions in Table 3. States can be mentioned
in two categories owing to regime changes over time.
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Table (3) - Effects of the different policy dimensions characterizing medical marijuana laws (MML) across US states on bad mental health days.
No. of days No. of days No. of days No. of days No. of days No. of days No. of days No. of days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Two years before MML −0.108 −0.108 −0.107 −0.104 −0.104 −0.104 −0.104 −0.101
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078)
One year before MML −0.087 −0.086 −0.088 −0.082 −0.083 −0.082 −0.086 −0.081
(0.110) (0.112) (0.112) (0.111) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.115)
Overall MML −0.227∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗ −0.117 −0.225∗∗ −0.182∗ −0.234∗∗∗ −0.103 −0.174∗
(0.106) (0.095) (0.109) (0.102) (0.098) (0.090) (0.107) (0.099)
Home cultivation − 0.028 − − 0.373∗∗∗ 0.017 − 0.385∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.090) (0.098) (0.086)
Unspecific pain − − −0.181 − −0.143 − −0.202∗ −0.148
(0.112) (0.101) (0.106) (0.099)
Operating dispensaries − − − 0.113∗ − 0.046 −0.002 0.041
(0.064) (0.062) (0.052) (0.060)
Home × pain − − − − −0.336∗∗∗ − − −0.359∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.101)
Home × dispensary − − − − − 0.082 − −0.080
(0.108) (0.104)
Pain × dispensary − − − − − − 0.156∗ 0.006
(0.092) (0.050)
Home × pain (x) dispensary − − − − − − − 0.191∗
(0.114)
Border × MML 0.082 0.086 0.055 0.062 0.044 0.065 0.038 0.025
(0.061) (0.063) (0.064) (0.060) (0.060) (0.065) (0.063) (0.059)
Border MML −0.074 −0.074 −0.063 −0.074 −0.051 −0.072 −0.060 −0.049
(0.068) (0.067) (0.071) (0.066) (0.072) (0.066) (0.070) (0.070)
Time FE
State FE
State trends
Controls
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Observations 6,349,173 6,349,173 6,349,173 6,349,173 6,349,173 6,349,173 6,349,173 6,349,173
Adjusted R2 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088
∗ p < 0.1 ; ∗∗ p < 0.05 ; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(Satiated specification) No. of days
(9)
Two years before MML −0.101
(0.078)
One year before MML −0.081
(0.115)
Law only −0.174∗
(0.099)
Home cultivation 0.211∗
(0.109)
Unspecific pain −0.322∗∗∗
(0.101)
Operating dispensaries −0.133
(0.124)
Home and pain −0.296∗∗∗
(0.108)
Home and dispensary 0.172
(0.192)
Pain and dispensary −0.275∗∗
(0.110)
Home and pain and dispensary −0.139∗
(0.074)
Border × MML 0.025
(0.059)
Border MML −0.049
(0.070)
Time FE
State FE
State trends
Controls
Clusters 51
Observations 6,349,173
Adjusted R2 0.088
∗ p < 0.1 ; ∗∗ p < 0.05 ; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The average number of bad mental health days (dependent variable) amounts to 3.36. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. “Satiated
specification” (column (9)) means that coefficients for different treatments can be interpreted autonomously; i.e., they are not interactions but an estimate of the
combined effect of all the policy dimensions involved. An overview of which states contribute to the respective policy dimension estimates can be found in Table 2.
Data source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
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The various dimensions seem to affect mental health to different degrees. Concentrating
on column (9), a striking pattern emerges, highlighting “unspecific pain” (i.e., pain where a
clear diagnosis is not required for the prescription) as a strong predictor of positive effects on
mental health. The large effects of the regimes that stipulate the unspecific pain condition
might be driven the patients’ easier access to the drug; however, they could equally result from
an incentive to use the drug for recreational purposes, as this policy might come along with
the potential for diversion. In Section 5.3, we will provide some evidence that the first driver
presumably dominates, which is based on an analysis of the population of likely pain sufferers.
The consequences of operating dispensaries for mental health remain ambiguous in our
results. If anything, they seem to reduce eventual benefits of MMLs somewhat, which is
most pronounced in the presence of all three policy dimensions. A possible explanation for
this is that dispensaries need not necessarily work as additional sources of supply, but rather
as replacements for existing outlets. For instance, in March 2011, Arizona declared that
only people living further than 25 miles away from a state dispensary were allowed to be
served by a grower. Another difficulty is finding an appropriate measure for dispensaries.
For example, it is debatable whether measuring the effect of dispensaries by a simple binary
variable (rather than, say, a population coverage measure) is appropriate. Furthermore,
it remains ambiguous whether so-called “collective gardens”, which are unions of licensed
growers and/or patients, should not be treated as de facto dispensaries too.12
While institutional variation is an obvious source for effect heterogeneity, differential responses
across groups are a natural refinement as well. The next sections explore how the reported,
largely beneficial effects of MMLs are distributed over socio-demographic clusters and other
subgroups in the population.
4.4 Differential effects on demographic subgroups
Public debates on MML policy often primarily address the possible effects of cannabis
regulations on particular demographic groups. Previous research has found differential effects
for different segments of the population (see Section 2 for a discussion). Adolescents and
young adults, especially males, are a prime example (Hammer 2015). We therefore estimate
separate MML effects for different groups conditional on certain age ranges and gender.
The results are reported in Table 4. Comparing columns (1) and (2), which distinguish
the results between men and women, we observe that, overall, men and women do not
seem to be affected differently by an MML regarding the main effect (i.e., the effect in
the absence of spill-overs from neighboring MMLs). However, compared to women, the
treatment effect for men is smaller if a bordering state’s MML is in place at the time
of the law’s introduction. Furthermore, the positive effect of the no jail policy on bad
12. Some recent articles study the spatial effects of cannabis dispensaries. While Mair et al. (2015), Kepple
and Freisthler (2012), Morrison et al. (2014) and Freisthler et al. (2013) study neighbourhood effects regarding
metrics such as cannabis dependence or crime rates in California, Shi, Meseck, and Jankowska (2016) show
that the placement of dispensaries in Colorado is highly non-random and seemingly tied to household incomes
and ethnic separation.
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mental health is disproportionately stronger for women, while it is unsystematic for men. In
columns (3) and (4), samples are further restricted to the age category 18 to 24, which is
the youngest category available in the BRFSS. This sample restriction, combined with the
gender separation, obviously leads to a substantial loss of precision, as each subsample only
comprises approximately 2% of all observations. Still, the estimates suggest that MMLs have
no systematic harmful effect on either group. The sample selection in column (5) is inspired
by Reinarman et al. (2011) who identify young to middle-aged white men as those most
likely to apply for marijuana cards in California. We find no hints of systematic negative
effects on mental health for this supposed “risk group”. While the negative treatment point
estimate is somewhat larger than in the general population, it is imprecisely measured
and not statistically significantly different from zero. This result is in line with, for ex-
ample, the decreased sickness absence at work in middle aged men reported by Ullman (2017).
Column (6) focuses on people older than 64 years of age. This separate analysis is informative
for two reasons. First, as shown by Han et al. (2017), this group has become increasingly
responsive to MMLs over the recent years. This fact has only recently gained recognition in
public debates. One reason for the upward trend in consumption might be the availability
of new forms of administering the drug, such as vaping or marijuana smoothies (Schauer
et al. 2016). Second, as the hazard of conditions such as chronic pain or neuropathy rises
with age, cannabis use in this group is more likely to be due to genuine medical needs.
Interestingly, while the treatment effect decreases in size, its precision increases. Furthermore,
we observe a significant “fade-in” one year prior to the effective implementation. Including
the beneficial border effect (which is completely offset by the border interaction), the results
are consistent with the hypothesis that elderly patients experience relevant improvements
owing to the new therapeutic options.
5 Effects for likely cannabis users and pain sufferers
5.1 Hypothetical propensity estimation
Since MMLs target patients who might benefit from the treatment option, we want to allow
for differing effects of cannabis regulations for this group, i.e., pain sufferers and medical
marijuana consumers. Another subsample of interest are recreational marijuana users. While
these people would not be affected directly by the law, this latter group might still be
influenced by diversion, cultural change or impacts on illicit supply. Formally, we do this by
augmenting the baseline equation with dummies for the respective consumer groups, group
specific linear time trends and interactions with MMLs, the no jail policies and recreational
regimes, as well as neighbourhood effects. However, the consumer status is not reported in
the BRFSS for the studied time horizon. In order to impute the missing information, we
use an auxiliary data set from the NSDUH to predict consumption propensities for each
observation in the BRFSS in a first step. These estimated propensities will then allow us to
partition the sample into likely abstainers, recreational users and medical users. To derive
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Table (4) - Overall effect of medical marijuana laws (MML) on bad mental health of selected demographic groups.
All ages Age 18-24
Men Women Men Women White men 24-64 Age 64-100
No. of days No. of days No. of days No. of days No. of days No. of days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Two years before MML −0.053 −0.154 0.012 −0.490∗ −0.073 0.034
(0.057) (0.111) (0.218) (0.293) (0.081) (0.085)
One year before MML −0.045 −0.119 0.103 −0.307 −0.220 −0.135∗∗
(0.089) (0.142) (0.184) (0.281) (0.151) (0.067)
Overall MML −0.233∗∗ −0.217∗ −0.089 −0.328 −0.264 −0.146∗∗
(0.101) (0.116) (0.207) (0.379) (0.167) (0.073)
Border × MML 0.161∗∗ 0.002 0.204 −0.136 0.052 0.094
(0.077) (0.063) (0.197) (0.261) (0.083) (0.080)
Border MML −0.094 −0.060 −0.060 −0.078 −0.112 −0.094∗∗
(0.072) (0.070) (0.111) (0.169) (0.085) (0.043)
Sample means 2.68 3.78 3.38 4.85 2.86 2.21
Time FE
State FE
State trends
Controls
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51
Observations 2,516,826 3,832,347 136,549 159,982 1,375,729 1,844,252
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.084 0.022 0.025 0.031 0.093
∗ p < 0.1 ; ∗∗ p < 0.05 ; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The row sample means reports the average number of bad mental health days (dependent variable) in the respective sample.
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Data source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
the propensities, we use the following two questions asked in the NSDUH:
(1) “During the past 30 days, on how many days did you use marijuana or hashish? ”13
(2) “Was any of your marijuana use in the past 12 months recommended by a doctor or
other health care professional? ”
Regarding the first question (which is available for the years 1994-2015), we first recode
the variable as a dummy which equals one if consumption occurred on at least five days
during the past month (i.e. marijuana was consumed on a weekly basis). We then fit a
predictive model using only variables which are reported in both the BRFSS and the NSDUH.
Beside basic socio-demographics and year effects, we include smoking status, the number
of days a person has consumed alcohol during the past thirty days and their Body Mass Index.
In order to derive the consumption propensities, we employ stochastic gradient boosting
with decision trees as the base learners. This non-parametric boosting approach “learns” the
functional form of the data generating process which predicts the outcome best according to
some metric (see, e.g., Friedman 2002).14 Our motivation for applying this specific method
is three-fold. First, as our time period spans 23 years, cohort effects are likely to play a role.
Seniors in 1995 respond differently to an MML than seniors in 2015. Trying to incorporate
such effects parametrically would either increase the number of coefficients exponentially
(evoking the curse of dimensionality) or require arbitrary parameter restrictions. Second,
this method is able to exploit the rich available variation on the individual-level to the fullest.
Lastly, stochastic gradient boosted decision trees routinely head comprehensive machine
learning rankings (Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil 2006, Caruana, Karampatziakis, and Yesse-
nalina 2008, Caruana, Karampatziakis, and Yessenalina 2008). Performance diagnostics for
our predictions can be found in Appendix B.2.
Using the model fitted on the NSDUH data in the first step, we then predict individual
propensities to consume marijuana for medical and recreational reasons in the BRFSS in
a second step. Here, we have to address the fact that MMLs plausibly induce selection
effects, as cannabis regulations are likely to change the pool of users and the quantities
people choose to consume. Hence, a simple regression on the factual propensities (i.e., the
estimated likelihood to consume cannabis given the actual treatment status) will lead to
biased estimates. For our evaluation of the effects of MMLs, we need to compare those
people who consume under an MML with the respondents from the untreated states who
would consume cannabis if an MML were in place. In our propensity regression, we thus
replace the factual propensities for the control observations with the counterfactual ones,
13. Some interviewees also reported the number of consumption days during the past year. We largely
reproduce our results using this alternative metric, but at the cost of precision. We further abstract away
from the type of marijuana that has been consumed. Potency, purity and the mix of strains such as sativa,
indica or ruderalis, have a substantive impact on the effect of cannabis. For example, the connection between
the incidence of psychosis and marijuana usage is highly dependent on the consumed mixture (Schubart
et al. 2011, Di Forti et al. 2009, Mehmedic et al. 2010). However, our data does not allow us to differentiate
along this dimension.
14. We use the implementation in the R package xgboost (Chen and Guestrin 2016).
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i.e., those propensities which we would observe if they were to live under an MML. We call
the propensities derived from this replacement the hypothetical propensities. Furthermore, to
equalize treated and untreated (potential) consumers regarding differential compositional
time trends, we also enforce predictions to be made as if everyone lived in the year 2015.
Figure 11 shows the distributions of both the factual and hypothetical propensities. The
final classification of observations as either likely abstainers, recreational users or medical
users was determined according to the procedure described in Appendix B.3.
Figure (11) - Distribution of factual and hypothetical propensities for recreational and
medical cannabis use.
Medical
user
4% of sample
Recreational
user
6% of sample
Medical Recreational
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Propensity for consumption mode
Propensity type  Factual  Hypothetical 
Notes: For counterfactual predictions, the MML dummy is set to one for control observations
and the year is fixed at 2015 for everyone. A respondent is classified as a recreational
consumer if intake occurred on at least five days during the past 30 days. The thresholds are
chosen so that they reproduce the hypothetical national prevalence of marijuana consumption
in the United States. The x-axes are capped at 40% to improve the display. Data source:
BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
5.2 Estimates for likely recreational and medical marijuana users
In the following, we use the described hypothetical propensity estimates to analyze the
differential MML effects for the subgroups with likely differing modes of consumption. Table
5 reports OLS estimates for the three groups of likely abstainers, recreational users and
medical users.15 We find big differences regarding the impact of MMLs on the three groups.
15. The regressions which involve propensity scores require an adjustment of the standard errors, since we
use an estimated explanatory variable which is itself subject to sampling variability. We use a two-stage
bootstrapping approach to correct for this. We have generally set N = 500, based on an empirical investigation
of convergence rates of standard errors.
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For likely medical users, the effect size increases more than three-fold compared to previous
results for the whole population. For both likely recreational users and likely abstainers, we
observe comparable negative effects on bad mental health days. However, the effects for these
latter groups will be qualified below based on a re-estimation of the same specification using
a regression-adjusted matching estimator. Overall, the results in Table 5 indicate that the
effects of MMLs differ widely across groups of the population. From a technical perspective,
it appears to be important that the estimation approach allows for effect heterogeneity.
In a robustness check, we pursue an approach that goes one step further where we re-estimate
the same specification using a regression-adjusted matching estimator.16 This matching
approach additionally enables us to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT) and the average treatment effect on the controls (ATC) in a straightforward way.
Technically, the estimation proceeds in two steps following Ho et al. (2007). First, we esti-
mate stabilized inverse probability weights which balance individual and some institutional
covariates across the treated and the control observations (Austin and Stuart 2015). For the
prediction of the treatment exposure, we employ stochastic gradient boosted decision trees
(the same method that we used to predict consumption propensity scores). In the second
step, we conduct an OLS estimation specified like the base equation and augmented with
consumer status dummies. With this procedure, we allow treatment responses to vary over
individual characteristics, the indicator for urbanity, Medicaid expenditures per capita, and
the state unemployment rate, as well as all first-order interactions between these variables.17
Figure 12 shows to what extent the ATE estimate changes with this more flexible specification,
and additionally reports estimates for the average effect on the treated (ATT) and on the
controls (ATC). It is revealed that the point estimates for both abstainers and recreational
users remain largely unaffected, while the precision of the estimates diminishes substantially.
Notably, the effect on abstainers cannot be distinguished from zero anymore. In contrast,
the effect size of the average treatment estimate for medical users increases by approximately
50%. Thereby, the ATT estimate is approximately half the size of the ATE estimate, implying
that effect heterogeneity in the group of medical users is substantial.18 This is consistent
16. Another motivation for this approach is Słoczyński (2017), who shows that both the exclusion of outliers
regarding control variables and the flexible allowance for heterogeneous treatment responses conditional on
covariates can have a substantial effect on the estimates. For example, given that very different people with
diverse ailments might be classified as medical users, it is reasonable to check for the impact of allowing for
such heterogeneity.
17. The reusage of control variables from the first stage would not be necessary if we were completely
convinced that our data generating process concerning treatment exposure was correctly learned by our
non-parametric estimator. Yet in addition to a further reduction of residual covariate imbalances which the
boosting estimator might not have been able to eradicate, the re-estimation with all controls yields the so
called “double-robustness” property. The latter ensures that only either one of the selection specification
or the outcome specification needs to be correct for consistent estimation. This effectively shields our
estimations against both potential over- or underfitting of the data regarding the true functional form of the
data-generating process (Słoczyński and Wooldridge 2018).
18. In particular, the decomposition of the ATE reveals that the latter is disproportionately driven by an
increased incidence of covariate combinations in control states which would have predicted a substantial
benefit from the introduction of an MML in a treated state. This suggests that hypothetical users in states
without access to medical marijuana would benefit even more than medical users in treated states. Such
conclusions, however, need to be drawn with caution. First, the width of the confidence intervals indicates
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Table (5) - Effects of medical marijuana laws (MML) on bad mental health of likely abstainers,
recreational users and medical users.
No. of days
Abstainer Recreational user Medical user
Two years before MML −0.096 −0.284 −0.145
(0.080) (0.296) (0.338)
One year before MML −0.090 0.204 −0.492∗
(0.122) (0.242) (0.273)
Overall MML −0.215∗ −0.200 −0.710∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.201) (0.243)
Border × MML 0.046 0.451∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.129) (0.143)
Border MML −0.068 −0.036 −0.399∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.137) (0.145)
No jail 0.133∗ 0.180 0.061
Sample means 3.158 5.01 6.358
Time FE − −
State FE − −
State trends − −
Controls − −
Clusters 51 − −
Observations 6, 029, 498 202, 351 117, 324
Adj. R2 0.091 − −
∗ p < 0.1 ; ∗∗ p < 0.05 ; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) belong to the same regression. Treatment and neighbourhood effects
are satiated regarding the propensity group; i.e., coefficients per column can be interpreted
independently of the other columns belonging to the same regression. Propensity thresholds
have been set to reproduce hypothetical NSDUH rates in the weighted sample. The row
sample means reports the average number of bad mental health days (dependent variable) in
the respective sample. Standard errors have been bootstrapped using 500 replications. Data
source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
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with the results of the same analysis excluding observations from California (see Figure 21
in Appendix D). While the ATT for medical users remains similar in magnitude, the ATE
and the ATC do no longer differ from the ATT. The point estimates for the effects on the
mental health of abstainers and recreational users are close to zero. Overall, allowing for a
flexible weighting of conditional treatment responses seems to be a sensible robustness check.
Moreover, the results suggest that some of the mixed findings in the literature might be due
to insufficient allowance for effect heterogeneity.
Figure (12) - Regression-adjusted matching estimates for the effect of medical marijuana
laws on bad mental health, i.e., the average treatment effect (ATE), the average treatment
effect on the treated (ATT) and the average treatment effect on the controls (ATC) for
different cannabis consumer groups.
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Notes: Standard errors have been obtained by bootstrapping using 500 replications. Confi-
dence intervals are set at 90%. Data source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
substantial uncertainty in the effect sizes. Second, interpreting the ATT and the ATC estimates as being
causal requires the fulfillment of distinct assumptions. For the ATT, it requires that if a treated state had
not been treated, expected mental health conditional on covariates would be the same as in the control
states. In contrast, a causal interpretation of the ATC estimate requires that if a control state had been
treated, expected conditional outcomes would coincide with those in a de facto treated state. Since the ATE
is composed of both the ATT and the ATC, both assumptions are necessary to interpret the ATE estimate in
a causal way. Since unobserved heterogeneity in control states might mediate the effect of an MML in ways
which we cannot gauge in our data analysis, we suggest that the ATT estimate is the more reliable anchor
for the expected effect of MMLs which might be introduced in the future.
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5.3 Estimates for likely pain sufferers
As discussed in Section 4.3, unspecific pain as a qualifying medical condition for the thera-
peutic use of marijuana is a strong predictor of the potential beneficial effects of MMLs on
mental health. In order to gain further insights about this finding, we repeat the analysis
that we used for different modes of consumption with respect to the propensity to suffer
from frequent pain. We use the following question from the BRFSS to predict hypothetical
pain propensities: “During the past 30 days, for about how many days did pain make it hard
for you to do your usual activities such as self-care, work or recreation? ” We categorize
respondents who suffered for a minimum of five days as being frequent pain sufferers. Figure
13 shows the distributions of both the factual and the hypothetical propensities. Here, the
hypothetical propensities are calculated for the situation in which no MML is in place. The
group of likely pain sufferers thus reflects the ex ante situation including also those people
who may no longer suffer from pain after a treatment with medical marijuana becomes legally
available. The propensity threshold for a positive prediction was set at the 84% quantile to
reproduce the prevalence of chronic pain in the United States in 2012 (Nahin 2015).
Figure (13) - Distribution of the factual and hypothetical propensities to experience frequent
pain.
No pain
0−4 days
84% of sample
Frequent pain
5+ days
16% of sample
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Hypothetical propensity to suffer from pain
Propensity type  Factual  Hypothetical 
Notes: For counterfactual predictions, the year has been fixed at 2015. The pain status for
this category as people who have experienced pain on at least fifteen days during the past 30
days. The threshold has been chosen to reproduce the national prevalence of chronic pain in
2012 (Nahin 2015). Data source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
Figure 14 summarizes the results for the matching approach.19 We first discuss the ATE
estimates which are represented by the red elements in the graph. The effect of an MML
on those individuals who are unlikely to suffer from pain is both smaller and less precisely
19. The corresponding OLS results can be found in Appendix F, Table 12.
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estimated than the global effect reported in Table 1. In line with the results for MMLs
which allow unspecific pain as a qualifying condition in Section 4.3, the improvements in
mental health for people likely to suffer pain are more than twice as large as they are for
the remaining population and amount to almost half a day less of bad mental health per
month. Yet, for both groups, the ATE estimate comes with a large standard error and is
statistically insignificant. When we look at the results for the ATT estimates (which are
represented by the green elements), substantial and systematic benefits are revealed for
those likely to suffer pain. The reported ATT for likely pain sufferers amounts to around six
days per year less of bad mental health, and is thus close to the effect on the treated using
medical cannabis presented earlier in the discussion. This finding is robust to the exclusion of
observations from California (see Figure 22 in Appendix D). The significant effects identified
for the groups of people likely to use medicinal marijuana and the group likely to suffer from
frequent pain suggest that a substantial part of the therapeutic value of cannabis might stem
from its capacity to alleviate pain with fewer side-effects compared to established drugs.
Figure (14) - Regression-adjusted matching estimates for the effect of medical marijuana
laws on bad mental health, i.e., the average treatment effect (ATE), the average treatment
effect on the treated (ATT), and the average treatment effect on the controls (ATC) for
people who are unlikely or likely to suffer from pain.
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Notes: Standard errors have been obtained by bootstrapping using 500 replications. Confi-
dence intervals are set at 90%. Data source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
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6 Interaction with Prescription Drug Monitoring Pro-
grams
A plausible channel through which MMLs influence mental health are potential substitution
effects. In addition to those people who start consuming cannabis because access becomes
easier, there might well be others who replace their current drug of choice by cannabis. Such
potential substitution effects seem particularly important given the contemporary upward
trends in prescription drug abuse (Dart et al. 2015). A legal supply of quality-controlled
marijuana (for medical purposes) might well curb the more damaging illicit intake of other
substances for recreational purposes or self-medication. Empirically, the relevance of such
considerations is demonstrated by the consequences of the nationwide introduction of abuse-
deterrent OxyContin in the United States in August 2010. Alpert, Powell, and Pacula (2017)
show that almost every death prevented by decreased OxyContin abuse was replaced by one
due to a heroine overdose. This evidence suggests that prohibitive interventions might be
ineffective or even backfire when the availability of potential substitute drugs is not taken
into account. At least for opioid addicts who genuinely suffer from pain, we argue that
substitution using marijuana is likely to be preferable to synthetic opioids such as heroin
or the highly potent newcomer Fentanyl. We test this argument on the basis of another
supply-side intervention endorsed widely across the United States, i.e., the introduction of
so-called Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs).
PDMPs are state-level policies built on a statewide database containing the prescription
histories of patients. The specific PDMP regimes show considerable variation across states
regarding physicians’ obligations: While participation is voluntary in some designs, others
require physicians to check the database every time they prescribe drugs that are potentially
addictive. When focusing on interventions that strictly require checkups when prescriptions
are issued, it is likely that the introduction of a PDMP will immediately disrupt illicit drug
supply. Previous evidence indicates that PDMPs are, in fact, associated with significant
drops in opioid prescriptions as well as death rates (Bao et al. 2016, Patrick et al. 2016). Yet,
judgments about net welfare effects are difficult to deduce from these findings alone. For
those people who are not confronted with life-or-death choices, it remains unclear whether
they simply gravitate towards other substances and how their mental health is affected.
We hypothesize that there is greater potential for a PDMP’s introduction to have positive
welfare effects if an MML is in place, because cannabis would be more easily accessible as a
relatively safe substitute (compared to other substances).
Using the same data as before, we test whether the states which introduce mandatory PDMPs
experience more positive effects if an MML is in place at the time of the introduction. The
same empirical strategy is applied as previously with MMLs. The estimands are the effects
of PDMP treatment dummies interacted with a dummy indicating the presence or absence of
an MML. As the earliest PDMP introduction date is June 2012 in West Virginia, we restrict
our sample to observations from 2009 onwards. In this way, we include a sufficient number
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of pre-treatment periods to estimate leads and state-trends, while reducing the incidence of
confounding institutional variation and cohort effects. Additionally, we restrict the set of
states to those whose MML was in place before 2012. Furthermore, we drop the five states
that initiated recreational programs up until the end of 2015. In total, these restrictions
result in estimates which are based on 11 treated states, of which 4 ran a parallel MML, and
29 control states.
Figure 15 summarizes the results. The estimates suggest that, on average, a PDMP in a
state with an MML caused around 0.4 fewer bad mental health days per a month than one
in a state without a MML.20 This is a substantial difference that is statistically significant
at the 1% level (test not shown). Surprisingly, the estimation results suggest that PDMPs
in states without a medical marijuana supply might even have led to a short-term net
decrease in mental health. However, we are cautious in the interpretation of our findings.
Especially, the estimate of the harmful effect of PDMPs in the absence of an MML is only
marginally statistically significant, and we cannot analyze the post-treatment dynamics due
to a shortage of data. Furthermore, it is not clear how the potentially endogenous relationship
between PDMPs and the restrictiveness of the specific MML implementations affects out
in the estimates. While strict PDMPs are more likely to be introduced in states which
disproportionately suffer from abuse problems, the latter also tend to introduce the tightest
MMLs (see, e.g., New York). It is not clear a priori how these countervailing factors should
balance out. Yet, especially given the substantial effect size, we argue that our estimate is
a first indication that MMLs can be understood as justifiable complements to restrictive
supply-side interventions on the drug market.
20. The results remain qualitatively the same when we retain another pre-treatment year and control for
quadratic state-trends. We also conducted a placebo test where PDMP introduction dates were reshuﬄed
at random among treated states 500 times. Our treatment effects both passed the 1% significance hurdle
determined by the distribution of pseudo effects.
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Figure (15) - Lead and main effects of mandatory Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs
(PDMPs) on bad mental health conditional on the presence of a MML.
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Notes: The data were restricted to 2009 onwards. The states IL, MD, MN, NH, MA and
NY are excluded as their MMLs were introduced after 2012. Additionally, CO, WA, OR,
DC and AK are also excluded due to their introduction of recreational allowances.
State-specific trends are included. Confidence intervals are set at 90%. Data source: BRFSS.
Calculated using survey weights.
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7 Conclusions
The consequences of legal access to medical marijuana for individual welfare are a matter
of controversy. We contribute to the ongoing discussion by evaluating the impact of the
staggered introduction and extension of MMLs across US states on self-reported mental
health. Our analysis is based on individual-level data with more than six million observations
and exploits 24 interventions over 23 years on the state-level. Employing two-way fixed
effects as well as matching estimators, we present and discuss net effects on mental health
outcomes for the population as a whole and relevant subgroups.
We find no evidence of systematic negative effects on mental health due to the liberalization
of medical marijuana for the US population aged 18 and above. Complemented with the
results of Dills, Goffard, and Miron (2017), who report an absence of detrimental effects on
highschool students under relaxed cannabis regulations, the finding of no systematic harm
seems to hold for the US population in general. In contrast, our main specification points
towards overall gains in the population. Our average treatment effect estimate indicates
a reduction of approximately two bad mental health days a year for the representative
citizen. We further show that the estimated improvements in mental health in the general
population are mainly driven by people who report either light or severe mental health
problems. Furthermore, most of these benefits accrue in the first three years after the
adoption of a MML. Differentiating between the effects across states shows that California
contributes disproportionately to the overall positive effect on mental health. Yet allowing
for state-specific MML effects and averaging over the interventions, the overall effect remains
a systematic reduction of around 1 day a year.
Furthermore, we find large differential responses to MMLs conditional on cannabis con-
sumption modes. While we cannot identify statistically significant effects for abstainers and
recreational users, medical users experience systematic gains in terms of their mental well-
being. For the latter group, our matching estimate for the average treatment effect indicates
that individuals report on average around one day less a month with bad mental health under
a liberal cannabis regime. This effect size is approximately one half of the negative impact of
frequent alcohol binge drinking on US adults (Okoro et al. 2004). In an alternative partition,
we concentrate on people who are likely to suffer from chronic pain. We estimate a reduction
of approximately one half of a bad mental health day per month for this group if an MML is
in place. Combined with the result for medical users with an effect of similar magnitude,
the findings suggest that direct consumption effects are the main drivers behind these benefits.
Examining substantive differences between cannabis laws, states which list unspecific pain
as a qualifying condition for access to medical marijuana exhibit the largest benefits. This
indicates that easier access for patients might overcompensate other potentially adverse
effects, such as increased harmful diversion. For the four states that temporarily only allowed
for home cultivation, we observe a reduction in mental health. Meanwhile, the role of
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dispensaries remains ambiguous. While their presence is often brought up as an indication
of law effectiveness in research and the media, no clear pattern regarding their impact
emerges in our results. In summary, law implementations which underline their medicinal
motivation and grant (limited) supply rights to consumers seem to have the biggest potential
for welfare enhancements. Finally, we present evidence that supply-side interventions aiming
to curb the illicit supply of (non)-medical drugs might be complementary to MMLs. Our
results indicate that Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) only had a pos-
itive impact on mental health in those states which also had a medical marijuana law in place.
Overall, our results are in line with the hypothesis that MMLs benefit those categories of
individuals for which they are nominally designed without harming other groups systemati-
cally. Furthermore, taking into account the largely positive effects to be expected by such
regulations on a systemic level, our work lends additional weight to positions which favour
less restrictive regulations of cannabis consumption.
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Appendix A Robustness checks
A.1 Alternative specifications and sample restrictions
Given the considerable response differences across states reported in Figure 9, the question
about the “appropriate” weighting of observations is an important one. Throughout the main
article, we employ the survey weights constructed by the BRFSS. In this way, we respect
both the differential precisions of the states’ contributions to the ATE and come closer to an
appropriate weighting of average partial effects (at least for matching estimates, see Solon,
Haider, and Wooldridge 2015). Yet, one might hold the position that an unweighted average
of every state intervention is more informative for policy makers. While we report such an
estimate in Section 4.2, another approach would be to normalize weights in state-year cells
such that they sum to one.21 We report such estimates in the columns (1) to (4) in Table 6
where the specification is taken from the global regression in Table 1.
Besides weight normalization, there are arguments which cast doubt on whether survey
weights should be employed at all (again, see Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge 2015). We do
not follow this reasoning in the main analysis because the responses to MMLs are surely
quite different across the population. Since we are interested in net policy effects, these
differing average partial effects should be aggregated correctly. Otherwise, it is not clear
which population is the subject of the inferences that we draw. Still, for the interested reader,
we report estimates without survey weights in columns (5) to (8) in Table 6.
A.2 Matching estimates for global effects
In a supplementary analysis, we report matching estimates of the ATE under the global
specification in Table 1. We include this as a robustness check to see whether an alternative
weighting scheme of average partial effects over observables has a substantive impact. With
regard to the left-hand side of Figure 16, differences to the fixed effect estimates are minor.
Furthermore, we see no substantive differences between estimates for the effects on the
treated and the controls. In addition, the right-hand side of the plot reports estimates when
we allow for a two-year transitory period after the implementation of an MML (green) and
a long-term effect thereafter (blue). In agreement with Figure 7, benefits accrue in earlier
periods and become unsystematic later on.
21. Note that this approach has the drawback of biasing standard errors. A weight normalization implies
that we ignore the differential precision of states’ contributions to the regression estimates due to varying
subsample sizes.
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Figure (16) - Regression-adjusted matching estimates of (dynamic) overall MML effects on
bad mental health.
Without dynamics With dynamics
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Confidence intervals are set at 90%.
Notes: Besides all individual characteristics, heterogeneous effects due to differential state
Medicaid expenditures and unemployment rates are reflected in the estimates. Data source:
BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
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Table (6) - Global specifications for the effects of MMLs on bad mental health applying different weights.
Normalized survey weights No survey weights
No. of days No. of days No. of days No. of days No. of days No. of days No. of days No. of days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Two years before MML −0.054 −0.058 −0.061 −0.064 −0.039 −0.040 −0.044 −0.048
(0.051) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034)
One year before MML −0.009 −0.017 −0.024 −0.030 −0.020 −0.028 −0.034 −0.041
(0.056) (0.054) (0.054) (0.047) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.040)
Overall MML −0.027 −0.024 −0.031 −0.040 −0.028 −0.043 −0.045 −0.052
(0.065) (0.060) (0.062) (0.058) (0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.054)
Border × MML − −0.018 −0.022 0.009 − 0.015 0.003 0.018
(0.069) (0.071) (0.069) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055)
Border MML − −0.075 −0.079 −0.172∗∗∗ − −0.077∗ −0.066 −0.125∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.057) (0.045) (0.044) (0.049) (0.041)
Sample means 3.365 3.365 3.368 3.363 3.343 3.343 3.385 3.31
Time FE
State FE
State trends
Controls
Clusters 51 51 45 29 51 51 45 29
Observations 6,349,173 6,349,173 5,540,433 3,631,697 6,349,173 6,349,173 5,540,433 3,631,697
Adjusted R2 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.096 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.102
∗ p < 0.1 ; ∗∗ p < 0.05 ; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: In columns (3) and (7), only states are included which introduce or have in place some kind of liberalising cannabis regulation during our sample period. The
samples in columns (4) and (8) are further restricted to states which eventually introduce some kind of effective marijuana measure as categorized in the Marijuana
Policy Project (2016). Columns (1) to (4) normalize sample weights, such that they sum to one inside state-year cells. In columns (5) to (8), no survey weights are
used. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The row sample means reports the average bad mental health days (dependent variable) of the respective sample.
Data source: BRFSS.
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Appendix B Prediction diagnostics
In Section 5, we study the differential effects of MMLs on the mental well-being of likely
medical cannabis users, likely recreational cannabis users as well those likely to suffer
from pain. In the following, we explain our design choices when calculating the respective
propensities.
B.1 Predictors
For the calculation of the likely consumer status, we include as many controls as possible
from the second step (mental health regression) in the first step (consumption regression) in
order to minimize dependence between controls and propensity scores. The only restriction
is that predictors need to be elements of the variable intersection between the BRFSS and
the NSDUH. Table 7 reports basic statistics for the used variables.
As we were not granted access to the scientific-use file of the NSDUH, we cannot use state-
level variables for predictions. In addition to socio-economic characteristics, we include the
frequency of alcohol consumption during the past 30 days, the smoking status as well as
the Body Mass Index as predictors in our estimation of the propensities. While these latter
variables would be questionable controls in the equation applied in the second step due to
endogeneity concerns, we deem the gain in predictive power in the first step sufficient to
compensate for an eventual “pollution” of the second step (as some endogenous parts in the
propensity scores might be captured).
B.2 Performance
We report performance diagnostics for our boosting predictions along two dimensions. First,
we check the accuracy of the probabilities generated by our model. We assess this using
a calibration plot as shown in Figure 17. Observations are sorted into bins according to
their predicted probability of being a positive case. We choose ten-percentage-points bins
where the numbers in the boxes report the number of observations falling into the respective
bin. For each bin, the true share of positive cases is then compared to the predicted one.
A deviation from the diagonal line indicates bias on the side of the classifier. As can be
seen, our model is excellently calibrated with a slight underprediction of positive cases in the
lowest range.
In addition to the calibration plot, we report a confusion matrix and standard metrics of
separation quality in Table 8. The right-hand column of the matrix reveals that our ability to
separate abstainers from consumers using a propensity threshold is rather modest. According
to the metrics, we can expect around 38% of those classified as probable positive cases to be
actual consumers. In contrast, non-consumers are easy to predict. Although we use AUC to
hypertune xgboost due to imbalance, predictions are still conservative regarding negative
cases.
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Table (7) - Summary descriptives for the NSDUH variables used to predict the cannabis
consumption status.
Variable Mean/SD
Alcohol days: 4.36 (6.81)
Smoking:
no 68.8%
yes 31.2%
Children:
none 66.6%
one 14.9%
two 12.1%
three+ 6.45%
Sex:
female 54.1%
male 45.9%
Income:
less 10k 35.0%
less 20k 21.2%
less 50k 28.6%
more 50k 11.2%
NA 4.05%
Age:
[18, 24) 34.2%
[24, 34) 28.6%
[34, 64) 31.0%
[64, 100) 6.21%
Variable Mean/SD
Education:
some highschool 16.9%
highschool 32.7%
some college 28.8%
college 21.6%
Employment:
employed 70.4%
unemployed 6.37%
other 23.2%
Race:
white 64.7%
black 12.5%
other 22.8%
Cannabis days 1.46 (5.61)
Marital status:
married 39.5%
divorced 9.47%
widowed 2.73%
never married 48.3%
BMI 27.1 (6.12)
Medical marijuana 0.02 (0.20)
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Figure (17) - Calibration plot of boosting predictions regarding the extensive margin of
cannabis consumption.
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Confidence intervals are set at 95%.
Notes: Performance is based on a 20% evaluation subsample which has not been used during
training. The x -axis is capped such that 99,9% of the classified observations are represented
in the graph. The numbers in the white boxes are the counts of observations inside the
respective bins.
Table (8) - Confusion matrix and performance indicators of boosting predictions for the
extensive margin of cannabis consumption.
Actual
value
Prediction
No use User Sum
No use
TN
122,100
FP
5,100 127,200
User
FN
5,000
TP
3,100 8,100
Sum 127,100 8,200
Performance metrics
AUC 85 %
Accuracy 93 %
Sensitivity 29 %
Specificity 97 %
Balanced acc. 63 %
Notes: The threshold is set to reproduce the estimated national prevalence in the NSDUH
sample. Frequencies are rounded to the hundreds digit, and metrics are rounded to the
second decimal for readability. Data source: NSDUH. Calculated using survey weights.
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B.3 Threshold selection for propensity groups
In general, we choose thresholds in propensity regressions such that hypothetical national
prevalences for cannabis consumption in the NSDUH are reproduced. When we analyze three
categories in the regression underlying Table 5, we face the problem that some observations
are both likely to be recreational and medical consumers. Since these categories are mutually
exclusive, we see no means of interpreting this “cross-over” category in a natural way. Let
“clear” predictions be those who are either likely to be recreational or medical users. To the
best of our knowledge, no scientific consensus has been reached so far in how to arrive at
clean categorisations for all observations in the presence of overlap. Hence, we propose an
idiosyncratic procedure which works in four steps:
(1) Set the propensity thresholds for recreational and medical consumers such that, in the
absence of overlap, national hypothetical prevalences would be enforced. In our case,
some predictions will have a high propensity for both classes, making the clear predictions
fall short of national rates.
(2) Decrease the threshold for both classes proportionally to their distance to 100% until
the sum of clear positive and cross-over predictions equals the national prevalence of
cannabis consumption.
(3) Inside the cross-over category, standardize the propensity scores for recreational and
medical use separately. Then take the difference between standardized recreational and
medical scores. If the value of one such difference is k, the interpretation is that the
recreational score lies k standard deviations further above the recreational cross-over
mean than the medical score lies above the medicinal mean.
(4) Taking the standardized score differences from the top downwards, classify so many
observations as recreational such that clear predictions plus the newly assigned observa-
tions equal the national prevalence for recreational use. The remaining observations are
then classified as medical, enforcing the medical prevalence as well by construction.
B.4 Predictor rankings for probable recreational/medical consumers
and probable pain sufferers
Figures 18 and 19 show which individual characteristics contribute the most to predicting
the status of a likely recreational/medical consumer or a likely pain sufferer.
51
Figure (18) - Ranking of top 15 predictors of recreational and medical cannabis consumption
across all decision trees fitted using stochastic gradient boosting.
Income: less 50k
Race: other
Age: [24, 34)
Income: 50k+
Job: other
Divorced
College
Male
Age: 34−64
MML
Age: 64−100
Never married
Body Mass Index
Alcohol days
Smoking
0 25 50 75 100
Normalized Gini importance
Notes: The underlying importance metric is average Gini impurity reduction (Strobl,
Boulesteix, and Augustin 2007). We do not report separate importance rankings for medical
and recreational users as the R package xgboost does not offer such a feature. Data source:
NSDUH. Calculated using survey weights.
Figure (19) - Ranking of top 15 predictors of frequent pain across all decision trees fitted
using stochastic gradient boosting.
Unemployment rate
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Age 44−54
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Notes: The underlying importance metric is average Gini impurity reduction (Strobl,
Boulesteix, and Augustin 2007). Data source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
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Appendix C Matching diagnostics
In order to assess the inverse probability weighting (IPW) in our matching in Section 5, we
report two graphical diagnostics (Austin and Stuart 2015). Note that we employ stabilized
weights which take into account the unconditional likelihood of receiving the factual treatment
(Cole and Hernán 2008). Figure 20 shows a so-called “Love plot” of the ten most unbalanced
covariates in the survey weighted sample after adjustment as measured by the standardized
mean difference (SMD).22 Let xt and st be the mean and standard deviation of some variable
in the treated sample, respectively. If c instead of t is used in the subscript, the variables
belong to the control sample. The standardized mean difference is then given as
d = (xt − xc)/
√
(s2t + s
2
c)/2.
As an empirical rule of thumb, a SMD below 0.1 is deemed excellent while .25 has been
proposed as well as a less conservative threshold. In the plot, we see that reweighting
decreases the SMD for all the shown variables below .25 (with slight yet insubstantial decline
in balance for some variables). This holds for all other variables not shown in the plot as
well, including first-order interactions. The relevant output is available upon request. In
summary, the achieved balance after the inverse probability weighting is acceptable.
We only balance for state Medicaid expenditures and unemployment rates in the IPW step
instead of all institutional variation. The reason is that overlap, one of the components
of the strong ignorability assumption which is necessary for causal inference, requires that
0 < P(MMList = 1 | Xist, Zst) < 1. Our non-parametric boosting approach , however,
quickly identifies perfect separation between the treated and controls if we allow for “too
many” state variables in the propensity stage. For this reason we restrict the selection to those
two institutional variables for which we expect the highest moderating effect on the treatment
response. Furthermore, in order to enforce overlap, we dropped 78,000 observations, which
is approximately 1% of the sample. The minimum, mean, and maximum of the estimated
ATE IPW weights are .21, 1.02 and 28.32, respectively.
22. We employ survey weights both in the propensity score estimation and the second-step outcome
regression. As shown by Ridgeway et al. (2015), this is necessary to conduct inference over the right
population (i.e., non-institutionalised US adults).
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Figure (20) - Overview of pre-post matching covariate balance as quantified by the variable-
wise standardized absolute difference.
Age: 54−64
Job: employed
Kids: none
Race: other
Race: black
Educ: college
Urban: metro
Urban: rural
Unemp. rate
Medicaid
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Absolute Mean Differences
Sample
Adjusted
Unadjusted
Notes: The selection is restricted to the ten most unbalanced variables in the adjusted sample
in descending order. The dashed lines at .1 and .25 represent rules of thumb proposed in
the literature to distinguish between excellent, acceptable and bad balance after matching
(Stuart 2010). Data source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
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Appendix D Effect heterogeneity across consumer groups:
robustness checks
Figure (21) - Robustness check excluding observations from California – Regression-adjusted
matching estimates for the effect of medical marijuana laws on bad mental health, i.e., the
average treatment effect (ATE), the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and the
average treatment effect on the controls (ATC) for different cannabis consumer groups.
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Notes: Standard errors have been obtained by bootstrapping using 500 replications. Confi-
dence intervals are set at 90%. Data source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
55
Figure (22) - Robustness check excluding observations from California – Regression-adjusted
matching estimates for the effect of medical marijuana laws on bad mental health, i.e., the
average treatment effect (ATE), the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), and the
average treatment effect on the controls (ATC) for people who are unlikely or likely to suffer
from pain.
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Notes: Standard errors have been obtained by bootstrapping using 500 replications. Confi-
dence intervals are set at 90%. Data source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
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Appendix E Substitution effects
Whether cannabis acts as a substitute or a complement to alcohol and nicotine is an impor-
tant issue in prevention research (see, e.g., Reiman 2009). Depending on the relationship,
MMLs might also affect mental well-being via the consumption of related addictive goods.
Table 9 reports estimates (adopting the specification from the base analysis in Table 1) for
four different characterizations of the consumption status.
Table (9) - Substitution effects regarding alcohol consumption and smoking due to medical
marijuana laws (MML).
Alcohol Heavy alcohol Smoking Smoking & alcohol
No. of days Binary Binary Binary
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Two years before MML −0.006 0.003 −0.004∗ −0.001
(0.054) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
One year before MML −0.331 −0.014 −0.004 −0.011
(0.276) (0.014) (0.003) (0.009)
Overall MML 0.057 0.003 −0.007∗∗ −0.004∗
(0.070) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Border × MML −0.103 −0.0002 0.002 0.003
(0.080) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Border MML 0.034 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.056) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Sample means 4.22 0.201 0.205 0.121
Time FE
State FE
State trends
Controls
Clusters 51 51 51 51
Observations 5,826,329 5,826,329 6,343,207 5,826,329
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.082 0.104 0.063
∗ p < 0.1 ; ∗∗ p < 0.05 ; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Respondents are coded as smokers and alcohol consumers, respectively, if they
consumed either of these goods at least once during the previous week. Heavy alcohol
consumption is defined as more than seven drinks per week. Data source: BRFSS. Calculated
using survey weights.
Regarding alcohol, we do not find systematic effects of MMLs on the frequency of drinking
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(column 1) or on the likelihood of being an intensive drinker (column 2). However, the
results in column (3) suggests that the introduction of MMLs reduce smoking by roughly 0.7
percentage points. This effect is transferred to the results in column (4), where we observe a
slight reduction of 0.4 percentage points for people who both drink and smoke. Some of the
improvements in mental health that we report in the article might thus be due to changes in
the consumption of tobacco products.
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Appendix F Descriptive statistics and regression outputs
Table (10) - Summary descriptives for the BRFSS and complementary state-level data.
Variable Mean/SD
Alcohol days 4.40 (7.71)
Smoking:
No 81.6%
Yes 18.4%
Children:
None 68.9%
One 12.5%
Two 11.6%
Three 7.06%
Sex:
Female 60.4%
Male 39.6%
MML 0.24 (0.43)
BMI 27.3 (5.72)
No jail 0.26 (0.44)
Recreational 0.01 (0.11)
Healthplan:
No 11.0%
Yes 89.0%
Medicaid 720 (234)
TANF 34.6 (33.6)
Race:
White 81.1%
Black 7.95%
Asian 1.79%
Nativ 1.47%
Other 7.72%
Marital status:
Married 54.9%
Divorced 13.8%
Widow 12.5%
Separated 2.22%
Never married 14.1%
Couple 2.43%
Education:
None 0.18%
Elementary 3.09%
Some highschool 6.34%
Highschool 30.2%
Some college 27.1%
College 33.0%
Employment:
Employed 46.1%
Self-employed 8.59%
Long-term unemployed 2.13%
Short-term unemployed 2.43%
Homemaker 7.24%
Student 2.33%
Retired 25.2%
Unable 6.02%
Variable Mean/SD
Income:
Less 10k 4.99%
Less 15k 5.36%
Less 20k 7.02%
Less 25k 8.72%
Less 35k 11.6%
Less 50k 14.3%
More 50k 35.0%
NA 13.1%
Age:
[18, 24) 4.67%
[24, 34) 11.8%
[34, 44) 16.0%
[44, 54) 18.8%
[54, 64) 19.7%
[64, 100) 29.0%
Unemployment rate 6.03 (2.06)
Mental health 3.34 (7.61)
Home cultivation 0.19 (0.39)
Operating dispensaries 0.08 (0.28)
Mental health expenditures 75.9 (45.3)
Beer tax 0.19 (0.16)
Unspecific pain 0.17 (0.37)
Cigarette tax 0.76 (0.56)
Border MML 0.43 (0.50)
Border recreational 0.04 (0.20)
Dynamic MML:
None 75.6%
Transitory 4.67%
Long-term 19.7%
Minimum wage 4.57 (0.48)
City taxonomy:
Rural 26.7%
Urban 30.1%
Metropolitan 28.9%
NA 14.3%
Party control:
Totally republican 29.0%
Mostly republican 18.7%
Bipartisan 1.43%
Mostly democratic 22.6%
Totally democratic 28.3%
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Table (11) - Complete output for the global regression underlying Table 1, column (2) based
on data from the BRFSS and calculated using survey weights.
Cannabis regulations
Two years before MML −0.11 (0.08)
One year before MML −0.08 (0.11)
Effective MML −0.22 (0.11)∗∗
Border MML −0.08 (0.07)
Border × MML 0.07 (0.06)
No jail 0.14 (0.07)∗∗
Recreational 0.24 (0.07)∗∗∗
Border recreational −0.15 (0.09)∗
State and county controls
Medicaid 0.00 (0.00)∗∗∗
TANF −0.00 (0.00)∗∗
Unemployment rate −0.00 (0.02)
Beer tax −0.28 (0.35)
Cigarette tax 0.21 (0.07)∗∗∗
Minimum wage 0.02 (0.04)
Reference: Rural
Urban 0.15 (0.03)∗∗∗
Metropoly 0.25 (0.03)∗∗∗
Rural or urban: NA 0.04 (0.03)
Reference: Totally republican
Mostly republican −0.01 (0.05)
Bipartisan −0.04 (0.10)
Mostly democratic 0.04 (0.06)
Totally democratic −0.00 (0.07)
Individual controls
Reference: No children
One child 0.05 (0.02)∗∗
Two children −0.01 (0.03)
Three children 0.07 (0.04)∗
Reference: Single
Divorced 1.10 (0.02)∗∗∗
Widow 0.45 (0.04)∗∗∗
Separated 2.27 (0.14)∗∗∗
Never married 0.45 (0.04)∗∗∗
Couple 0.85 (0.05)∗∗∗
Healthplan −0.49 (0.12)∗∗∗
Healthplan × Medicaid −0.00 (0.00)
Healthplan × TANF 0.00 (0.00)∗∗∗
Reference: Employed
Self-employed 0.10 (0.02)∗∗∗
Long unemployed 2.72 (0.08)∗∗∗
Short unemployed 1.94 (0.05)∗∗∗
Homeworker 0.12 (0.03)∗∗∗
Student 0.30 (0.05)∗∗∗
Retired 0.47 (0.04)∗∗∗
Unable to work 7.05 (0.10)∗∗∗
Reference: Income: less 10k
Income: less 15k −0.40 (0.04)∗∗∗
Income: less_20k −0.79 (0.09)∗∗∗
Income: less_25k −1.00 (0.07)∗∗∗
Income: less_35k −1.29 (0.10)∗∗∗
Income: less_50k −1.49 (0.10)∗∗∗
Income: more_50k −1.87 (0.11)∗∗∗
Income: NA −1.65 (0.08)∗∗∗
Reference: No school
Elementary school 0.26 (0.08)∗∗∗
Some highschool 0.78 (0.09)∗∗∗
Highschool 0.22 (0.12)∗
Some college 0.35 (0.11)∗∗∗
College −0.28 (0.11)∗∗∗
Reference: Age [18, 24)
Age [24, 34) −0.15 (0.06)∗∗
Age [34, 44) −0.11 (0.07)
Age [44, 54) −0.35 (0.07)∗∗∗
Age [54, 64) −1.23 (0.07)∗∗∗
Age [64, 100) −2.67 (0.07)∗∗∗
Male −1.54 (0.06)∗∗∗
Reference: White
Black −1.01 (0.19)∗∗∗
Asian −1.27 (0.24)∗∗∗
Native 0.09 (0.33)
Other race −1.15 (0.15)∗∗∗
Reference: Age [18, 24) and Male
Age [24, 34) × Male 0.38 (0.08)∗∗∗
Age [34, 44) × Male 0.25 (0.07)∗∗∗
Age [44, 54) × Male 0.23 (0.06)∗∗∗
Age [54, 64) × Male 0.51 (0.07)∗∗∗
Age [64, 100) × Male 1.22 (0.07)∗∗∗
Reference: Age [18, 24) and White
Age [24, 34) × Black 0.29 (0.13)∗∗
Age [34, 44) × Black 0.27 (0.14)∗
Age [44, 54) × Black 0.22 (0.13)∗
Age [54, 64) × Black 0.03 (0.15)
Age [64, 100) × Black 0.50 (0.14)∗∗∗
Age [24, 34) × Asian −0.03 (0.15)
Age [34, 44) × Asian −0.41 (0.13)∗∗∗
Age [44, 54) × Asian −0.16 (0.23)
Age [54, 64) × Asian 0.16 (0.19)
Age [64, 100) × Asian 0.71 (0.29)∗∗
Age [24, 34) × Native 0.20 (0.23)
Age [34, 44) × Native 0.34 (0.33)
Age [44, 54) × Native 1.19 (0.38)∗∗∗
Age [54, 64) × Native 0.93 (0.32)∗∗∗
Age [64, 100) × Native −0.01 (0.33)
Age [24, 34) × Other race −0.11 (0.13)
Age [34, 44) × Other race 0.11 (0.14)
Age [44, 54) × Other race 0.73 (0.12)∗∗∗
Age [54, 64) × Other race 1.23 (0.17)∗∗∗
Age [64, 100) × Other race 1.43 (0.30)∗∗∗
Reference: Male and White
Male × Black 0.33 (0.14)∗∗
Male × Asian 0.70 (0.27)∗∗
Male × Native −0.02 (0.57)
Male × Other 0.69 (0.16)∗∗∗
Reference: Age [18, 24) and Male and White
Age [24, 34) × Male × Black −0.07 (0.11)
Age [34, 44) × Male × Black −0.29 (0.19)
Age [44, 54) × Male × Black −0.11 (0.18)
Age [54, 64) × Male × Black 0.13 (0.14)
Age [64, 100) × Male × Black −0.02 (0.13)
Age [24, 34) × Male × Asian −0.26 (0.28)
Age [34, 44) × Male × Asian 0.32 (0.24)
Age [44, 54) × Male × Asian 0.17 (0.45)
Age [54, 64) × Male × Asian 0.02 (0.22)
Age [64, 100) × Male × Asian −0.40 (0.38)
Age [24, 34) × Male × Native 0.34 (0.47)
Age [34, 44) × Male × Native 0.83 (0.68)
Age [44, 54) × Male × Native −0.64 (0.67)
Age [54, 64) × Male × Native −0.54 (0.60)
Age [64, 100) × Male × Native 0.42 (0.53)
Age [24, 34) × Male × Other race −0.14 (0.12)
Age [34, 44) × Male × Other race −0.32 (0.19)∗
Age [44, 54) × Male × Other race −0.47 (0.13)∗∗∗
Age [54, 64) × Male × Other race −0.57 (0.20)∗∗∗
Age [64, 100) × Male × Other race −0.93 (0.22)∗∗∗
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Table (12) - Effects on those who are unlikely or likely to suffer from recent pain.
No. of days
Unlikely to suffer pain Likely to suffer pain
Two years before MML −0.078 −0.292
(0.087) (0.231)
One year before MML 0.011 −0.446
(0.086) (0.320)
Overall MML −0.188∗ −0.321∗∗
(0.100) (0.157)
Border × MML 0.045 0.198
(0.063) (0.183)
Border MML −0.073 −0.033
(0.074) (0.121)
Sample means 2.848 7.329
Time FE −
State FE −
State trends −
Controls −
Clusters 51 −
Observations 5, 333, 201 1, 015, 797
Adj. R2 0.09 −
∗ p < 0.1 ; ∗∗ p < 0.05 ; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) belong to the same regression. Treatment and neighbourhood
effects are satiated regarding the propensity group; i.e., coefficients per column can be
interpreted independently of the other columns belonging to the same regression. Propensity
thresholds have been chosen to reproduce the US national prevalence of chronic pain in 2012
(Nahin 2015). The row sample means reports the average number of bad mental health days
(dependent variable) in the respective sample. Standard errors have been bootstrapped using
500 replications. Data source: BRFSS. Calculated using survey weights.
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Table (13) - Overview of effective introduction dates of cannabis control policies by state.
State Code No jail MML Home Operating Unspecific Recreational
cultivation dispensaries pain
Alaska AK - 04.03.1999 04.03.1999 - 04.03.1999 24.02.2015
Arizona AZ - 01.04.2011 01.04.2011 06.12.2012 01.04.2011 -
California CA 01.01.1993 06.11.1996 06.11.1996 01.01.2003 06.11.1996 -
Colorado CO 01.01.1993 01.06.2001 01.06.2001 01.01.2005 01.06.2001 10.12.2012
Connecticut CT 30.06.2011 31.05.2012 - 22.09.2014 - -
Delaware DE 01.06.2015 01.07.2011 - 25.06.2015 13.05.2011 -
Hawaii HI - 28.12.2000 28.12.2000 - 28.12.2000 -
Illinois IL - 01.01.2014 - 09.11.2015 - -
Maine ME 01.01.1993 22.12.1999 22.12.1999 09.03.2011 - -
Maryland MD 01.10.2014 01.06.2014 - - - -
Massachusetts MA 01.01.2009 01.01.2013 01.01.2013 24.06.2015 - -
Michigan MI - 04.12.2008 04.12.2008 * 04.12.2008 -
Minnesota MN - 30.05.2014 - 01.07.2015 - -
Montana MT 01.01.1993 02.11.2004 02.11.2004 - 02.11.2004 -
Nevada NV 01.10.2001 01.10.2001 01.10.2001 31.07.2015 01.10.2001 -
New Hampshire NH - 23.07.2013 - - - -
New Jersey NJ - 01.10.2010 - 06.12.2012 - -
New Mexico NM - 01.07.2007 01.07.2007 01.07.2009 - -
New York NY 01.01.1993 05.07.2014 - - - -
Ohio OH 01.01.1993 - - - - -
Oregon OR 01.01.1993 03.12.1998 03.12.1998 15.08.2013 03.12.1998 01.07.2015
Rhode Island RI 01.04.2013 03.01.2006 03.01.2006 19.04.2013 03.01.2006 -
Vermont VT 01.07.2013 01.07.2004 01.07.2004 01.06.2013 - -
Washington WA - 03.11.1998 01.07.2008 - 03.11.1998 09.12.2012
District of Columbia DC - 27.07.2010 - 30.07.2013 - 26.02.2015
Notes: Dates earlier than 01.01.1993 are forced onto that date (i.e., the starting point of our survey data) and introductions later than 31.12.2015
are shown as ’-’. * We code Michigan as the only state that introduced operating dispensaries and abolished them later on. We set the respective
dates at 01.09.2009 and 01.08.2012.
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